The following is a discussion of the leadership of Thailand’s Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. It is interesting to note the contrasts and similarities between leaders such as Thaksin and North African leaders. Although basic human indicators are higher and the population has a real choice in who to elect, there is still a tint of kleptocracy present. Here, perhaps, it is better hidden from the least educated, rural majority. Also, with essentially fair elections, there is a need for, and a presence of, populism. Still, while the purpose behind Thaksin’s policies may be to gain influence, as we shall see, they have helped increase many of Thailand’s economic indicators and its global standing.
Thaksin began his career in the Royal Thai Police Department in 1973. Within five years, he had obtained Master’s and Doctoral degrees in Criminal Justice in the Unites States and received a high-ranking post in the police force, which he quit in 1980. An entrepreneur at heart, Thaksin and his wife ventured into several unsuccessful business ventures, before founding Shinawatra Computer and Communications Group and becoming the first to introduce cable TV, paging devices and mobile phones to Thailand. In 2001, after forming the political party, “Thais Love Thais” and rallying against political corruption, Thaksin won a landslide election to become Thailand’s PM.
Thaksin has run Thailand like an efficient business. He has privatized a state-owned oil and gas company and has attempted the same with the state-owned electricity company. The revenues from the IPOs are intended to be used to develop renewable energy sources.
Thaksin’s supporters tend to focus on his policies for reduction of rural poverty (through such policies as extended loans to farmers, subsidized gas prices, universal health care for $0.75 per visit, and so on) and his hand in Thailand’s economic recovery from the 1997 crisis. The name given to Thaksin’s economic policies is Thaksinomics. Since Thaksin has become PM, GDP per capita has risen nearly forty percent, and overall GDP has risen from $122 billion to $177.5 billion. During the first four years of his term, poverty dropped by ten percent, Thailand was able to repay its IMF loan two years early, and its national budget was balanced.
Thaksin also received strong support from the provinces as a cause of his swift actions following the tsunami crisis. While touring the southern regions, Thaksin initiated several processes to deal with the devastation. Interestingly, Thaksin refused foreign aid, claiming that Thailand was sufficiently strong to cope on its own.
Finally, support for Thaksin grew as the result of his heavy-handed anti-drug policies, which have reduced drug use in schools and has increased drug prices 2-3 fold (due to the damage done to the drug supply chain).
Thaksin’s opposition calls him a domineering CEO and bases its claims on his self-interest as a businessman, indeed, perhaps Thailand’s richest. There have been clams that Thaksin has used insider knowledge to promote his business interests and to save his business during the Asian Financial Crisis. However, Thaksin is also considered Thailand’s savior during the crisis. Also, in 2001, Thaksin was almost convicted of concealing business assets. There are also (thus far) unproven allegations that Thaksin bribed judges to acquit him. His opposition also claims that Thaksin’s welfare policies cause government overspending and that these reforms must be paid for by the middle class in the form of income tax.
In March of 2006, there was a mass protest outside of Thailand’s Government House, demanding that Thaksin step down. Interestingly, the protesters were the country’s elite who claim that he helped pass a tax-break which helped his family save $667 million in taxes on the sale of a cell phone company.
Thaksin was also alleged to have restricted freedom of the press in more than one incident. For example, in 2005 he sued a Thai newspaper for publishing a sermon given by a monk, in which Thaksin was claimed to desire the presidency, a non-existent position which would remove the king’s powers. Thaksin did not sue the monk, as monks are considered “above criticism”.
Thaksin Shinawatra certainly has improved Thailand’s economy in several ways, though he has burdened the middle class with these costs. It is hard to make a judgment on Thaksin’s leadership, overall. As westerners, we may be quick to judge him as the “right” leader for Thailand. As Buddhists, however, we might claim that Thaksin has forgotten the principles his country was based on in favor of cut-throat capitalism.
Saturday, April 11, 2009
International Leaders: Myanmar
The following is a review of the military dictatorship of Burma/ Myanmar’s (herein referred to as Myanmar) Than Shwe since 1992. After his 33-year (1953 – 1986) rise to major-general in the military, Than was appointed (in 1988) as a member of the newly-created State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and became the second in command of the previous ruler, General Saw Maung, who resigned in 1992. Than replaced him as Chairman of the Council, head of state, Secretary of Defense and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Than also took command of the military junta, which has been in place since 1989.
Than was, at first, thought to be more liberal than Saw Maung. He released political prisoners, ended the house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (see below), ordered the writing of a Constitution, opened up somewhat to foreign private trade, supported Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), moved toward ending political corruption, and allowed visits of the Red Cross and Amnesty International.
But Than has actually been consolidating power. He is known to be ruthless in dealing with potential opposition from within the government and army. Anyone believed to be defiant or a potential adversary is swiftly removed. Since Than has taken control and, recently, removed PM chief Gen Khin Nyunt from power, there has been increased uncertainty in the top ranks of the army, such as a strange story of a gun battle between the regime’s top three generals. “There is a tremendous amount of uncertainty. Even high ranking officers are not sure where they stand at the moment— if they are found to be linked to Khin Nyunt, they will be fired and face trial.” Also, when Than reached the mandatory retirement age of sixty, he extended it, implying that he may retain his position for the remainder of his life.
Another example of Than’s consolidation of power and intolerance of opposition is his dealing with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) (formed in 1988) and Nobel Peace Prize recipient. In 1989, the new military regime placed her under house arrest, where she has been (periodically) ever since. In 1990, the NLD won a landslide victory, but the military junta denied the election results.
Under Than, there has also been continued persecution of ethnic minorities, such as the Shan and Muslims. The Shan are spread throughout southern Asia and are considered rebels; they have been engaged in civil warfare with Myanmar for years. The Shan’s two main military forces are the Shan State Army North (SSA-N) and Shan State Army South (SSA-S). Myanmar forces have been known to burn down villages and force Shan to flee into neighboring Thailand. Than has also forced about 250,000 Muslims in the north to flee into Bangladesh.
Than is not considered knowledgeable in foreign affairs, thus, he has kept a neutral foreign policy. He has also kept himself and his people relatively isolated from world affairs (for example, by restricting free press). Still, many consider Myanmar as China’s stooge; China supplies the junta with arms and aid. Than has also secured financial aid from India, as a child does from two conflicted parents.
Interestingly, Than believes heavily in soothsaying. On October 25, 2005 Than made an unannounced visit to India. Note that That is distrustful of foreigners and that he had recently ousted Myanmar’s PM, making international travel a risk. It is claimed that Than’s personal astrologer recommended visiting Buddhist holy places in India, in order to avoid the bad luck associated with the October lunar eclipse.
As mentioned, Myanmar is a member of ASEAN; this ensures its maintaining peaceful relations with neighboring ASEAN members, such as Thailand. There has been increased pressure on Than for political reform, especially since, In 2006, Myanmar was scheduled to take over the chairmanship of ASEAN. However, to the relief of ASEAN, Myanmar has skipped its turn to chair the organization, based on the US complaints about its lack of democratic reform.
Than seems to want to be thought of as the effective king of Myanmar and to rule until his death. He has wisely avoided any direct antagonism toward the US and has minimized its exposure to his many human rights violations (for example, by not conducting a census), though Myanmar is known to be the world’s second largest producer of opium. He has also benefited from poor Indian-Chinese relations, as both would like to influence Myanmar. In short, Than is a devout kleptocrat who, in my opinion, is the product of his environment.
Than was, at first, thought to be more liberal than Saw Maung. He released political prisoners, ended the house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (see below), ordered the writing of a Constitution, opened up somewhat to foreign private trade, supported Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), moved toward ending political corruption, and allowed visits of the Red Cross and Amnesty International.
But Than has actually been consolidating power. He is known to be ruthless in dealing with potential opposition from within the government and army. Anyone believed to be defiant or a potential adversary is swiftly removed. Since Than has taken control and, recently, removed PM chief Gen Khin Nyunt from power, there has been increased uncertainty in the top ranks of the army, such as a strange story of a gun battle between the regime’s top three generals. “There is a tremendous amount of uncertainty. Even high ranking officers are not sure where they stand at the moment— if they are found to be linked to Khin Nyunt, they will be fired and face trial.” Also, when Than reached the mandatory retirement age of sixty, he extended it, implying that he may retain his position for the remainder of his life.
Another example of Than’s consolidation of power and intolerance of opposition is his dealing with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) (formed in 1988) and Nobel Peace Prize recipient. In 1989, the new military regime placed her under house arrest, where she has been (periodically) ever since. In 1990, the NLD won a landslide victory, but the military junta denied the election results.
Under Than, there has also been continued persecution of ethnic minorities, such as the Shan and Muslims. The Shan are spread throughout southern Asia and are considered rebels; they have been engaged in civil warfare with Myanmar for years. The Shan’s two main military forces are the Shan State Army North (SSA-N) and Shan State Army South (SSA-S). Myanmar forces have been known to burn down villages and force Shan to flee into neighboring Thailand. Than has also forced about 250,000 Muslims in the north to flee into Bangladesh.
Than is not considered knowledgeable in foreign affairs, thus, he has kept a neutral foreign policy. He has also kept himself and his people relatively isolated from world affairs (for example, by restricting free press). Still, many consider Myanmar as China’s stooge; China supplies the junta with arms and aid. Than has also secured financial aid from India, as a child does from two conflicted parents.
Interestingly, Than believes heavily in soothsaying. On October 25, 2005 Than made an unannounced visit to India. Note that That is distrustful of foreigners and that he had recently ousted Myanmar’s PM, making international travel a risk. It is claimed that Than’s personal astrologer recommended visiting Buddhist holy places in India, in order to avoid the bad luck associated with the October lunar eclipse.
As mentioned, Myanmar is a member of ASEAN; this ensures its maintaining peaceful relations with neighboring ASEAN members, such as Thailand. There has been increased pressure on Than for political reform, especially since, In 2006, Myanmar was scheduled to take over the chairmanship of ASEAN. However, to the relief of ASEAN, Myanmar has skipped its turn to chair the organization, based on the US complaints about its lack of democratic reform.
Than seems to want to be thought of as the effective king of Myanmar and to rule until his death. He has wisely avoided any direct antagonism toward the US and has minimized its exposure to his many human rights violations (for example, by not conducting a census), though Myanmar is known to be the world’s second largest producer of opium. He has also benefited from poor Indian-Chinese relations, as both would like to influence Myanmar. In short, Than is a devout kleptocrat who, in my opinion, is the product of his environment.
International Leaders: Libya
The following is a discussion of the historical and recent leadership of Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi. Rather than listing a timeline of Qadhafi’s dictatorship over Libya, the paper focuses on several interesting and noteworthy facts about his leadership, such as his lack of official office.
Qadhafi came into power in 1969 in a military coup, overthrowing king Idris. He then removed all American and British military bases, as well as expelling the native Italian and Jewish populations and nationalizing all foreign owned petroleum assets in order to have access to those revenues.
This coming into power is all too common in northern African Muslim states (besides Egypt). Also unsurprising is Qadhafi’s strict Islam principles and his military adventurism, being involved in numerous coup attempts in Egypt and Sudan. Further, his military both intervened in Chad’s civil war (as well as serving as a safe haven for separatist groups) and occupied parts of northern Chad – trying to gain access to minerals and influence in the Chadian government – between 1973 and 1987 before being forced to retreat. Under Qadhafi, Libya has claimed 32,000 square kilometers of southern Algeria and 25,000 of Niger. Qadhafi also sponsored terrorism on a global scale in the 1970’s and 80’s, using Libya’s oil revenues.
More unique is Qadhafi’s lack of official office. A decade after his takeover of the Libyan government Qadhafi resigned from all official posts, but retained his dictatorship. This move may have been intended to remove his international accountability (having no position, bodies such as the EU may not be able to hold him responsible for mistreatment of his people, or to blame the Libyan government for having human rights violators, war criminals, or terrorists in leadership positions) and possibly as a demonstration of his ability to keep power without office. The former was unsuccessful as the EU did place sanctions on Libya as a result of Qadhafi’s lack of cooperation in turning over those responsible for the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 in 1988 (such as the bombing’s orchestrator, Mussa Kussa, currently the head of Libyan External Security Organization).
These sanctions were lifted in September of 2003 after Qadhafi took steps to resolve the Pan-Am case, compensating the victims’ families. Since then it seems Qadhafi, like Chad’s Idriss Déby, has realized the need for cooperation with the western world. Also in 2003, Qadhafi agreed to disclose and end Libya’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. In 2004, Libya paid compensation to the families of victims of the UTA (1989) and La Belle disco (1986) bombings. Qadhafi has since hosted several western leaders, as well as traveling to Europe himself. Interestingly, when hosting Italian’s Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, Qadhafi has been known to subject him to watching documentaries of the Italian atrocities against Libya.
There is controversy about weather Qadhafi actually has the support of the Libyan people or weather he is only supported by the elite; it seems as if the latter is the case. While Libya has among Africa’s highest GDP per capita, there is large income disparity between classes, indicating that little of the oil-driven prosperity finds itself in the hands of the masses. Also, in 1993 there was an attempt at Qadhafi’s life by members of the Libyan army. Further, there have been several protests against Qadhafi. After a 1996 soccer match, a violent riot erupted in protest against Qadhafi. In February of 2006, the government organized a “planned demonstration” in front of the Italian consulate against an Italian minister’s wearing of a shirt with a cartoon depiction of Mohamed. Apparently, the demonstration soon turned into a riot of the lower class against Qadhafi’s regime.
Also interesting is Qadhafi’s introduction of the term “jamahiriyya”. The term means “state of the masses” and is intended to reflect control of the “masses” through a representative congress, labor unions, and other large organizations representing majority interests. This novel concept is clearly not reflected in the reality of Libya, especially considering the malcontent shown by the vast majority of the lower class.
In sum, Qadhafi’s military ambitions and his influence on global terrorism make him a very interesting dictator. It seems that, of late, he has become more moderate (no longer seeking to destroy Western capitalism) and that he has taken several steps to improve his (and, perhaps as a consequence, his people’s) global standing. Qadhafi is an example of a revolutionary dictator turned “soft” by the lure of capitalism (or the fear of the western stick). That is, the recent change in Qadhafi’s external attitude was, in the opinion of most, driven by necessity, not enlightenment.
Qadhafi came into power in 1969 in a military coup, overthrowing king Idris. He then removed all American and British military bases, as well as expelling the native Italian and Jewish populations and nationalizing all foreign owned petroleum assets in order to have access to those revenues.
This coming into power is all too common in northern African Muslim states (besides Egypt). Also unsurprising is Qadhafi’s strict Islam principles and his military adventurism, being involved in numerous coup attempts in Egypt and Sudan. Further, his military both intervened in Chad’s civil war (as well as serving as a safe haven for separatist groups) and occupied parts of northern Chad – trying to gain access to minerals and influence in the Chadian government – between 1973 and 1987 before being forced to retreat. Under Qadhafi, Libya has claimed 32,000 square kilometers of southern Algeria and 25,000 of Niger. Qadhafi also sponsored terrorism on a global scale in the 1970’s and 80’s, using Libya’s oil revenues.
More unique is Qadhafi’s lack of official office. A decade after his takeover of the Libyan government Qadhafi resigned from all official posts, but retained his dictatorship. This move may have been intended to remove his international accountability (having no position, bodies such as the EU may not be able to hold him responsible for mistreatment of his people, or to blame the Libyan government for having human rights violators, war criminals, or terrorists in leadership positions) and possibly as a demonstration of his ability to keep power without office. The former was unsuccessful as the EU did place sanctions on Libya as a result of Qadhafi’s lack of cooperation in turning over those responsible for the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 in 1988 (such as the bombing’s orchestrator, Mussa Kussa, currently the head of Libyan External Security Organization).
These sanctions were lifted in September of 2003 after Qadhafi took steps to resolve the Pan-Am case, compensating the victims’ families. Since then it seems Qadhafi, like Chad’s Idriss Déby, has realized the need for cooperation with the western world. Also in 2003, Qadhafi agreed to disclose and end Libya’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. In 2004, Libya paid compensation to the families of victims of the UTA (1989) and La Belle disco (1986) bombings. Qadhafi has since hosted several western leaders, as well as traveling to Europe himself. Interestingly, when hosting Italian’s Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, Qadhafi has been known to subject him to watching documentaries of the Italian atrocities against Libya.
There is controversy about weather Qadhafi actually has the support of the Libyan people or weather he is only supported by the elite; it seems as if the latter is the case. While Libya has among Africa’s highest GDP per capita, there is large income disparity between classes, indicating that little of the oil-driven prosperity finds itself in the hands of the masses. Also, in 1993 there was an attempt at Qadhafi’s life by members of the Libyan army. Further, there have been several protests against Qadhafi. After a 1996 soccer match, a violent riot erupted in protest against Qadhafi. In February of 2006, the government organized a “planned demonstration” in front of the Italian consulate against an Italian minister’s wearing of a shirt with a cartoon depiction of Mohamed. Apparently, the demonstration soon turned into a riot of the lower class against Qadhafi’s regime.
Also interesting is Qadhafi’s introduction of the term “jamahiriyya”. The term means “state of the masses” and is intended to reflect control of the “masses” through a representative congress, labor unions, and other large organizations representing majority interests. This novel concept is clearly not reflected in the reality of Libya, especially considering the malcontent shown by the vast majority of the lower class.
In sum, Qadhafi’s military ambitions and his influence on global terrorism make him a very interesting dictator. It seems that, of late, he has become more moderate (no longer seeking to destroy Western capitalism) and that he has taken several steps to improve his (and, perhaps as a consequence, his people’s) global standing. Qadhafi is an example of a revolutionary dictator turned “soft” by the lure of capitalism (or the fear of the western stick). That is, the recent change in Qadhafi’s external attitude was, in the opinion of most, driven by necessity, not enlightenment.
International Leaders: Germany
Germany’s Chancellor, Dr. Angela Merkel, has had an interesting political career to date. As a woman, she is part of a minority of female world leaders; as the leader of Germany, Merkel likely has the highest official post of any female leader today. One might argue that being a woman has actually helped her stand out in a male-dominated sphere and rapidly advance her career, which seems to have been characterized by a combination of merit and chance. It was not by chance, however, that Merkel became highly educated in sciences (see the fact sheet) and fluent in Russian and English.
Merkel spent her childhood in the countryside of communist East Germany. After the fall of the Berlin Wall she became involved in the democracy movement and joined a new party, Demokratischer Aufbruch. That year her party merged with the West German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and she became Minister for Women and Youth. Merkel’s began to advance, and she became more noticed, when she was chosen as Minister for the Environment and Reactor safety in 1994. In 1998 she was named Secretary-General of the CDU and in 2000, following a CDU financing scandal, she became the first female chair of the CDU. Being a protestant woman from northern Germany, many were surprised by her being chosen to lead a male-dominated, Catholic conservative party with its support base in western and southern Germany. This may indicate that Merkel was highly popular among her party’s constituents and was able to use non-traditional forms of influence within her party.
Avoiding the scandal and openly criticizing higher-ranking party members who were involved (including her mentor), she was able to build her persona as trustworthy, courageous, and credible. Merkel was considered more popular among the German population than among her own party and its ally, the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), whose leader (Edmund Stoiber) outmaneuvered her to become the party’s challenger for Chancellor in 2002. Stoiber lost a lead in the opinion polls and was not elected Chancellor. This helped Merkel become the leader of the opposition and the next candidate for the position of Germany’s Chancellor.
Merkel’s popularity among Germans increased when she criticized the government for supporting Turkish membership in the EU. She also supports strong ties with the US, as well as American open-market concepts. One of Merkel’s main goals is to improve the stagnant German economy (the third largest in the world, behind the US and China). Some of her tasks include reducing high wages and labor protection laws, increasing the average work-week, raising taxes, and improving the 12 percent unemployment rate. Also, she aims to improve the welfare system, which currently accounts for 48 percent of the entire federal budget.
A wave of renewed optimism about Germany’s economic performance in 2006 has been dubbed, The Merkel Factor. The number of Germans who believe that the government can contribute to an improvement in their lives was four times its level before Merkel was elected (just six months prior), 85 percent of respondents in a 2005 Der Spiegel (Germany’s largest weekly magazine) poll thought that 2006 would be a “good year”, consumer confidence was at its highest level in four years, and businesses were more optimistic about the future than they have been since 1989.
From her short hair to her “dull” clothes, it seems that Merkel is very non-traditional, especially considering her early years. Merkel studied sciences during a time when the field was heavily dominated by men; in fact, she obtained the highest degree in physical chemistry. Also, Merkel, in her second marriage, has never had children; this was likely due to beginning her political career at a young age. Finally, she is said to have become apt at hiding her emotions while spending nearly four decades in a communist society in which State Security Police were informed of every political dissent. Still, many perceive her as Germany’s new motherly figure.
Relative to many other world leaders, Merkel does not have “serious” problems; her country is not at war and its people are not dying of famine. Further, Germany’s strict code law system makes corruption less of a problem (though it does not eliminate it). Merkel’s problem in the near future will be maintaining her popularity among the German people while implementing plans to reform an outdated system of taxation, labor laws, welfare, and so on. Merkel must face a tradeoff: on one hand, labor unions have gone on warning strikes and workers seek higher wages; on the other hand, employers are not profitable with the currently high cost of labor and restrictions on firing people. How her Chancellorship unfolds and where she stands among her people will depend on her choices.
Merkel spent her childhood in the countryside of communist East Germany. After the fall of the Berlin Wall she became involved in the democracy movement and joined a new party, Demokratischer Aufbruch. That year her party merged with the West German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and she became Minister for Women and Youth. Merkel’s began to advance, and she became more noticed, when she was chosen as Minister for the Environment and Reactor safety in 1994. In 1998 she was named Secretary-General of the CDU and in 2000, following a CDU financing scandal, she became the first female chair of the CDU. Being a protestant woman from northern Germany, many were surprised by her being chosen to lead a male-dominated, Catholic conservative party with its support base in western and southern Germany. This may indicate that Merkel was highly popular among her party’s constituents and was able to use non-traditional forms of influence within her party.
Avoiding the scandal and openly criticizing higher-ranking party members who were involved (including her mentor), she was able to build her persona as trustworthy, courageous, and credible. Merkel was considered more popular among the German population than among her own party and its ally, the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), whose leader (Edmund Stoiber) outmaneuvered her to become the party’s challenger for Chancellor in 2002. Stoiber lost a lead in the opinion polls and was not elected Chancellor. This helped Merkel become the leader of the opposition and the next candidate for the position of Germany’s Chancellor.
Merkel’s popularity among Germans increased when she criticized the government for supporting Turkish membership in the EU. She also supports strong ties with the US, as well as American open-market concepts. One of Merkel’s main goals is to improve the stagnant German economy (the third largest in the world, behind the US and China). Some of her tasks include reducing high wages and labor protection laws, increasing the average work-week, raising taxes, and improving the 12 percent unemployment rate. Also, she aims to improve the welfare system, which currently accounts for 48 percent of the entire federal budget.
A wave of renewed optimism about Germany’s economic performance in 2006 has been dubbed, The Merkel Factor. The number of Germans who believe that the government can contribute to an improvement in their lives was four times its level before Merkel was elected (just six months prior), 85 percent of respondents in a 2005 Der Spiegel (Germany’s largest weekly magazine) poll thought that 2006 would be a “good year”, consumer confidence was at its highest level in four years, and businesses were more optimistic about the future than they have been since 1989.
From her short hair to her “dull” clothes, it seems that Merkel is very non-traditional, especially considering her early years. Merkel studied sciences during a time when the field was heavily dominated by men; in fact, she obtained the highest degree in physical chemistry. Also, Merkel, in her second marriage, has never had children; this was likely due to beginning her political career at a young age. Finally, she is said to have become apt at hiding her emotions while spending nearly four decades in a communist society in which State Security Police were informed of every political dissent. Still, many perceive her as Germany’s new motherly figure.
Relative to many other world leaders, Merkel does not have “serious” problems; her country is not at war and its people are not dying of famine. Further, Germany’s strict code law system makes corruption less of a problem (though it does not eliminate it). Merkel’s problem in the near future will be maintaining her popularity among the German people while implementing plans to reform an outdated system of taxation, labor laws, welfare, and so on. Merkel must face a tradeoff: on one hand, labor unions have gone on warning strikes and workers seek higher wages; on the other hand, employers are not profitable with the currently high cost of labor and restrictions on firing people. How her Chancellorship unfolds and where she stands among her people will depend on her choices.
International Leaders: French Guiana
French Guiana (FG) is a difficult case, in that it is not an independent country, but an overseas department (DOM) of France. Until 1951, FG was similar to early Australia, serving mainly as a penal settlement. Currently, the French president appoints a representative (or Préfet) and FG is considered a part of the European Union (Using the Euro and the French legal system, constitution, Armed Forces, and flag). With its dependency on France, one would not naturally consider France’s Préfet to FG as a world leader. Still, as Jacques Chirac has already been discussed, this review focuses on Ange Mancini, the Prefect of French Guiana. It is worth noting that only about five percent of FG’s 200,000 nationals want independence from France.
FG’s status precludes it from being listed on such websites as the World Bank and the US State Department and online news searches for its prefect return no matches. Indeed, after considerable time researching, the only information available seemed to be Mancini’s year of birth (1944). Exploring the EU’s Europa website, a FG developmental report revealed a website for the “Préfecture de la Région Guyane”, which does have some information on Mancini; however, it is in French. So, the information about Mancini (below) has been crudely interpreted.
A map of FG reveals that over 90 percent of its communes are concentrated along the coast in the north. The rest are along its borders and Säul (with a population of under 200) is the only “main” commune in the middle of the country. Cayenne, the capital, is the home of almost a third of the country’s population, 90 percent of which lives on the coast.
Prefect Ange Mancini was born in the French Alps. After completing his undergraduate education in the late 1960’s, he began a long and lucrative career in the French police forces. After becoming a police chief in 1973, he moved into the Criminal Investigation Department of Paris. Throughout his career, there has been a focus on anti-terrorism and anti-crime work. By the early 1990’s he had led and created several units with the aim of confronting urban organized and non-organized crime, before becoming the Associated Central Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (1995) and the General Manager of the National Police Force.
During his annual governmental addresses (between 2003 and 2006), Mancini’s intentions as a leader were revealed through his focus. Also, it is evident that, while he prefers to discus achievements, he also addresses the obstacles he faces. Mancini is concentrating his efforts on improving the population’s basic needs, while also trying to spur FG’s economy (FG’s unemployment percentage is in the twenties). Improving the transportation infrastructure has been his main goal (and, as he calls it, his department’s plague or black spot). Though he has managed to open a new bridge, connecting by road two communes, there is still a high level of roadway death caused by poor conditions. He has been trying to encourage “entrepreneurial dynamism” and foreign capital, in addition to the French and European aid. It is worth noting that the European Space Center in FG has brought with it several developments, but its skill requirements make it a mismatch for the human capital currently available in FG.
With his background in crime fighting, Mancini has done much to stop “clandestine gold washing”, “resource plundering”, and “illegal fishing”. He takes pride in having “more than 100 ‘Anaconda’ operations and nearly two tons… of seized or destroyed goods” (a rough translation). In 2005, Mancini took pride in the catching of 344 illegal fishermen (fishing accounting for about 75 percent of exports). There is no mention whether these fishermen were FG citizens.
It is interesting that Mancini would choose to focus resources to combat black market fishing at a time when his main goal is to provide basic needs for the people of FG. Black market fishing seems far less severe than illegal arms of drug trade and, although unregulated, contributed to FG’s GDP. One would assume that these resources could be used more efficiently.
Despite his preoccupation with crime prevention, Mancini’s focus on the future seems to make him an appropriate representative to this developing area.
FG’s status precludes it from being listed on such websites as the World Bank and the US State Department and online news searches for its prefect return no matches. Indeed, after considerable time researching, the only information available seemed to be Mancini’s year of birth (1944). Exploring the EU’s Europa website, a FG developmental report revealed a website for the “Préfecture de la Région Guyane”, which does have some information on Mancini; however, it is in French. So, the information about Mancini (below) has been crudely interpreted.
A map of FG reveals that over 90 percent of its communes are concentrated along the coast in the north. The rest are along its borders and Säul (with a population of under 200) is the only “main” commune in the middle of the country. Cayenne, the capital, is the home of almost a third of the country’s population, 90 percent of which lives on the coast.
Prefect Ange Mancini was born in the French Alps. After completing his undergraduate education in the late 1960’s, he began a long and lucrative career in the French police forces. After becoming a police chief in 1973, he moved into the Criminal Investigation Department of Paris. Throughout his career, there has been a focus on anti-terrorism and anti-crime work. By the early 1990’s he had led and created several units with the aim of confronting urban organized and non-organized crime, before becoming the Associated Central Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (1995) and the General Manager of the National Police Force.
During his annual governmental addresses (between 2003 and 2006), Mancini’s intentions as a leader were revealed through his focus. Also, it is evident that, while he prefers to discus achievements, he also addresses the obstacles he faces. Mancini is concentrating his efforts on improving the population’s basic needs, while also trying to spur FG’s economy (FG’s unemployment percentage is in the twenties). Improving the transportation infrastructure has been his main goal (and, as he calls it, his department’s plague or black spot). Though he has managed to open a new bridge, connecting by road two communes, there is still a high level of roadway death caused by poor conditions. He has been trying to encourage “entrepreneurial dynamism” and foreign capital, in addition to the French and European aid. It is worth noting that the European Space Center in FG has brought with it several developments, but its skill requirements make it a mismatch for the human capital currently available in FG.
With his background in crime fighting, Mancini has done much to stop “clandestine gold washing”, “resource plundering”, and “illegal fishing”. He takes pride in having “more than 100 ‘Anaconda’ operations and nearly two tons… of seized or destroyed goods” (a rough translation). In 2005, Mancini took pride in the catching of 344 illegal fishermen (fishing accounting for about 75 percent of exports). There is no mention whether these fishermen were FG citizens.
It is interesting that Mancini would choose to focus resources to combat black market fishing at a time when his main goal is to provide basic needs for the people of FG. Black market fishing seems far less severe than illegal arms of drug trade and, although unregulated, contributed to FG’s GDP. One would assume that these resources could be used more efficiently.
Despite his preoccupation with crime prevention, Mancini’s focus on the future seems to make him an appropriate representative to this developing area.
International Leaders: Egypt
The following is a discussion of the leadership of Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt. This discussion does not attempt to delineate the military history of Mubarak, nor does it focus on the timeline of his presidency. Instead, we discuss several interesting facts about Mubarak as a nation leader. Suffice it to say that Mubarak was born into an upper-middle class family and received his military education in Egypt and the Soviet Union, moving up the ranks of the Egyptian military before going into politics in the mid 1970’s and becoming President in 1981.
Mubarak’s leadership has been quite interesting. Although he was elected in 1981, he has also been reelected four times since. As was the case in Iraq with Hussein, until 2005, no one ran against Mubarak, due to the constitution which gives the People’s Assembly the main role in electing the President. This was the case until 2006, when Mubarak, under international pressure, passed an amendment allowing parties to run against the President; still, strict criteria must be met and there may be no religion-based political parties. The 2005 elections caused rioting against the rigging of votes by Mubarak’s party. As a result, the Egyptian police killed at least eight people on December 7th outside a polling station.
After getting Egypt readmitted to the Arab League in 1989, Mubarak began to lose support after unsuccessfully utilizing Egypt’s economic growth to meet people’s basic needs. Egypt’s ranking on the List of countries by Human Development Index (119) places it well below countries such as Mongolia, Nicaragua, and even the Palestinian Territories. Egypt also ranks 70th of 159 on the Corruption Perceptions Index under such countries as Mexico, Ghana, and Cuba. Freedom of expression has also been an issue increasing opposition against Mubarak. In March 2006, a female journalist was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for claiming that an Egyptian judge took bribes. This was the second such sentence imposed in two weeks.
Although Mubarak was popular among the people of Egypt before his presidency and through the early part of it, it seems as if he has lost much of his support. Egyptian and international entities alike are claiming that it is time for new leadership in Egypt. Egyptians, it seems, want to move toward liberalism. Mubarak, no matter how much he claims it, is not taking the necessary steps to meet his nation’s aspirations.
Mubarak’s leadership has been quite interesting. Although he was elected in 1981, he has also been reelected four times since. As was the case in Iraq with Hussein, until 2005, no one ran against Mubarak, due to the constitution which gives the People’s Assembly the main role in electing the President. This was the case until 2006, when Mubarak, under international pressure, passed an amendment allowing parties to run against the President; still, strict criteria must be met and there may be no religion-based political parties. The 2005 elections caused rioting against the rigging of votes by Mubarak’s party. As a result, the Egyptian police killed at least eight people on December 7th outside a polling station.
After getting Egypt readmitted to the Arab League in 1989, Mubarak began to lose support after unsuccessfully utilizing Egypt’s economic growth to meet people’s basic needs. Egypt’s ranking on the List of countries by Human Development Index (119) places it well below countries such as Mongolia, Nicaragua, and even the Palestinian Territories. Egypt also ranks 70th of 159 on the Corruption Perceptions Index under such countries as Mexico, Ghana, and Cuba. Freedom of expression has also been an issue increasing opposition against Mubarak. In March 2006, a female journalist was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for claiming that an Egyptian judge took bribes. This was the second such sentence imposed in two weeks.
Although Mubarak was popular among the people of Egypt before his presidency and through the early part of it, it seems as if he has lost much of his support. Egyptian and international entities alike are claiming that it is time for new leadership in Egypt. Egyptians, it seems, want to move toward liberalism. Mubarak, no matter how much he claims it, is not taking the necessary steps to meet his nation’s aspirations.
International Leaders: Czech Republic
A difficult task has been to determine who should be considered the Czech Republic’s (CR) leader: President Václav Klaus or Prime Minister (PM) Jiří Paroubek. The Czech constitution states that the president is indirectly elected by the parliament (not directly by the people) every five years. Some of the president’s powers include nominating Constitutional Court judges, dissolving parliament, complete immunity, and veto powers on legislation. Also, the president appoints the prime minister “who sets the agenda for most foreign and domestic policy, as well the other members of the cabinet on a proposal by the prime minister.”
Still, the presidency is considered by some to be more of a ceremonial position. For example Klaus, after loosing two elections, announced his intention to “resign from the leadership and run for president” and this was taken by many as a “graceful way of retiring”.
It seems like the Presidency in the Czech Republic is somewhere in between the ceremonial position of, say, Israel’s president, and the traditional (yet much admired and respected) position of the king of Thailand. Thus, for the purposed of this discussion, Prime Minister Paroubek is referred to as the country’s leader. This would surely infuriate Klaus, as the two do not seem to get along. For example, Klaus vetoed Paroubek;s decision to give same-sex couples registered partnership status, as well as his nomination of David Rath for the position of Health Minister.
Regarding political and economic stability the CR is perhaps the most advanced of the former communist nations. The country won its independence following the 1989 Velvet Revolution, a peaceful demonstration from November 16th through December 29th of about half of a million people for the end of the communist rule. Since then the CR has become a member of NATO and, more recently, the EU community. Though it still faces banking, energy, and telecommunications privatization issues, the CR is known as one of the fastest advancing countries of the former Soviet Republic influence, as is evident from a per capita GDP of almost $20,000. Further, the CR is ranked 31st (of 177 countries) on the HDI with an index of about 0.9. It also ranks 33rd (of 155 countries) on the Index of Economic Freedom (above countries such as Belgium and Japan) – an index which measures fifty variables such as corruption and trade barriers. Finally, Reporters Without Borders, a world-wide press freedom index, ranks the CR 9th (of 167 countries); the US ranks 44th.
Paroubek joined the Czechoslovak Socialist Party at the young age of 18 (1970) and was soon recruited to the state secret police, where he served until 1982. In 1989, after the Revolution, Paroubek joined the Czech Social Democratic Party and was given a top post. In the following years, Paroubek proved unsuccessful in political attainment. In fact, in the 2000 Senate elections, he received fewer votes than the communist party’s candidate. In 2004 Paroubek was named minister of regional development under Stanislav Gross (the former PM) and, after a finance scandal by Gross, succeeded him as the CR’s PM (April 25th, 2005).
During the first part of his tenure, Paroubek was highly popular. He was considered highly pragmatic and a good communicator in relation to past Prime Ministers. His popularity, it seems, peaked in August of 2005, before the CzechTek incident (below).
Overall, it seems Paroubek (nicknamed the “Political Bulldozer”) is unfit to be PM of the CR. In terms of his economic policies, the strengthening Czech currency is having adverse effects on exporters (and the entire economy) and the auto production industry (the vast majority of which is exported). Instead of taking steps to weaken the currency at the Czech National Bank, Paroubek has told exporters to “deal with it”. He has also written an article in which he defends himself and the Czech police after the killing of youth involved in a rave party (or, CzechTek). Since the CzechTek incident, he has been mocked by cartoonists, who have cynically said, “If Prime Minister Jiří Paroubek loses in June's general election, cartoonists across the country — regardless of their political affiliation — will weep… He's always saying ridiculous things and getting caught up in scandals. He claims that “techno fans are not dancing children, but dangerous people.” To him, these parties are not for dancing, but are intended to disrupt the “peaceful society”. Further, he is said to be outspoken against unfavorable criticism from opinion polls.
In 2006, floods caused major damage in the CR and throughout Central Europe. President Klaus, along with the media, claimed that Paroubek used this disaster to gain popularity before the June elections. It seems this plan did not work.
Still, the presidency is considered by some to be more of a ceremonial position. For example Klaus, after loosing two elections, announced his intention to “resign from the leadership and run for president” and this was taken by many as a “graceful way of retiring”.
It seems like the Presidency in the Czech Republic is somewhere in between the ceremonial position of, say, Israel’s president, and the traditional (yet much admired and respected) position of the king of Thailand. Thus, for the purposed of this discussion, Prime Minister Paroubek is referred to as the country’s leader. This would surely infuriate Klaus, as the two do not seem to get along. For example, Klaus vetoed Paroubek;s decision to give same-sex couples registered partnership status, as well as his nomination of David Rath for the position of Health Minister.
Regarding political and economic stability the CR is perhaps the most advanced of the former communist nations. The country won its independence following the 1989 Velvet Revolution, a peaceful demonstration from November 16th through December 29th of about half of a million people for the end of the communist rule. Since then the CR has become a member of NATO and, more recently, the EU community. Though it still faces banking, energy, and telecommunications privatization issues, the CR is known as one of the fastest advancing countries of the former Soviet Republic influence, as is evident from a per capita GDP of almost $20,000. Further, the CR is ranked 31st (of 177 countries) on the HDI with an index of about 0.9. It also ranks 33rd (of 155 countries) on the Index of Economic Freedom (above countries such as Belgium and Japan) – an index which measures fifty variables such as corruption and trade barriers. Finally, Reporters Without Borders, a world-wide press freedom index, ranks the CR 9th (of 167 countries); the US ranks 44th.
Paroubek joined the Czechoslovak Socialist Party at the young age of 18 (1970) and was soon recruited to the state secret police, where he served until 1982. In 1989, after the Revolution, Paroubek joined the Czech Social Democratic Party and was given a top post. In the following years, Paroubek proved unsuccessful in political attainment. In fact, in the 2000 Senate elections, he received fewer votes than the communist party’s candidate. In 2004 Paroubek was named minister of regional development under Stanislav Gross (the former PM) and, after a finance scandal by Gross, succeeded him as the CR’s PM (April 25th, 2005).
During the first part of his tenure, Paroubek was highly popular. He was considered highly pragmatic and a good communicator in relation to past Prime Ministers. His popularity, it seems, peaked in August of 2005, before the CzechTek incident (below).
Overall, it seems Paroubek (nicknamed the “Political Bulldozer”) is unfit to be PM of the CR. In terms of his economic policies, the strengthening Czech currency is having adverse effects on exporters (and the entire economy) and the auto production industry (the vast majority of which is exported). Instead of taking steps to weaken the currency at the Czech National Bank, Paroubek has told exporters to “deal with it”. He has also written an article in which he defends himself and the Czech police after the killing of youth involved in a rave party (or, CzechTek). Since the CzechTek incident, he has been mocked by cartoonists, who have cynically said, “If Prime Minister Jiří Paroubek loses in June's general election, cartoonists across the country — regardless of their political affiliation — will weep… He's always saying ridiculous things and getting caught up in scandals. He claims that “techno fans are not dancing children, but dangerous people.” To him, these parties are not for dancing, but are intended to disrupt the “peaceful society”. Further, he is said to be outspoken against unfavorable criticism from opinion polls.
In 2006, floods caused major damage in the CR and throughout Central Europe. President Klaus, along with the media, claimed that Paroubek used this disaster to gain popularity before the June elections. It seems this plan did not work.
International Leaders: Bangladesh
This is a brief review of the complexity of the current leadership of Bangladesh’s Khaleda Zia. The review begins with a brief explanation of her coming into power and continues with Khaleda’s actions thus far in regards to Bangladesh’s overall condition.
Bangladesh is among the world’s poorest and most densely populated countries. Bangladesh’s political and economic instability have made it susceptible to terrorist organizations, such as Al-Quaida, who seek sanctuary from international organizations. Geographically, the country is dominated by the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta and has annual monsoons and cyclones, flooding a full third of the country and impeding economic growth, over a third of which relies on agricultural production.
In terms of leadership turnover, Bangladesh is one of the most fascinating countries. Towards the end of the nine-month Bangladesh Liberation War (1970), Bengal forces received Indian aid and were able to achieve independence, becoming a parliamentary democracy under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. In 1975, after a national famine, Mujibur began single-party socialist rule and was soon assassinated. Bangladesh’s following made a variety of changes, including removing socialism, initiating a multi-party election-based system, making Islam a state religion, and declaring martial law before returning to parliamentary democracy. One of Bangladesh’s assassinated leaders was Ziaur Rahman who had founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and reinstated the multi-party system. After the resignation of Justice Sattar (the acting PM) in 1983, Ziaur’s widow, Khaleda Zia was elected BNP’s chairperson. BNP formed an alliance against the then current regime and Khaleda was detained many times before the 1990 resignation of the autocratic ruler (Mohammad Ershad). She then served as the PM from 1991 to 1996, and since 2001. Sheikh Hasina, a daughter of Mujib’s, was PM from 1996 to 2001.
Khaleda has tried to focus on improving education, especially for girls, introducing free, mandatory schooling for girls, until the tenth grade. She has also attempted to improve the economy by encouraging investment and the reduction of (non-tariff) trade barriers from its neighbor, India and by encouraging privatization of state-owned enterprises (contributing to a GDP growth of over five percent over the past few years). Recently, agreements on trade, as well as drug trafficking, were signed with India. Khaleda is rated as 29th on Forbes Power Women list.
Though Khaleda has made positive strides to improve Bangladesh’s situation, there are still many issues which need to be resolved before Khaleda can lead the country out of its 50 percent poverty rate. According to the WTO, Bangladesh's main problems include civil unrest, political instability (both internal and external), natural disasters (such as annual flooding), and inadequate infrastructure. Inelasticity of demand for commodities worldwide means that Bangladesh’s terms of trade (in agriculture) decline relatively, as world incomes increase. Other problems include India’s lack of trust of Khaleda’s political alliances (which included parties that support fundamentalist Islam), mismanagement of state-owned enterprises and port facilities, a labor force growth that has outpaced jobs, inefficient use of resources, slow implementation of reforms, and corruption.
Finally, despite widespread poverty and corruption, Bangladesh remains a democracy. That is, elections are free and fair. Although it cannot be considered completely illiberal, it is also not a well-functioning liberal democracy. I wonder what category Zakaria (The Rise of Illiberal Democracy) would place Bangladesh in, as a country with corruption and lawlessness, whose government seems to have liberal goals.
Bangladesh is among the world’s poorest and most densely populated countries. Bangladesh’s political and economic instability have made it susceptible to terrorist organizations, such as Al-Quaida, who seek sanctuary from international organizations. Geographically, the country is dominated by the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta and has annual monsoons and cyclones, flooding a full third of the country and impeding economic growth, over a third of which relies on agricultural production.
In terms of leadership turnover, Bangladesh is one of the most fascinating countries. Towards the end of the nine-month Bangladesh Liberation War (1970), Bengal forces received Indian aid and were able to achieve independence, becoming a parliamentary democracy under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. In 1975, after a national famine, Mujibur began single-party socialist rule and was soon assassinated. Bangladesh’s following made a variety of changes, including removing socialism, initiating a multi-party election-based system, making Islam a state religion, and declaring martial law before returning to parliamentary democracy. One of Bangladesh’s assassinated leaders was Ziaur Rahman who had founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and reinstated the multi-party system. After the resignation of Justice Sattar (the acting PM) in 1983, Ziaur’s widow, Khaleda Zia was elected BNP’s chairperson. BNP formed an alliance against the then current regime and Khaleda was detained many times before the 1990 resignation of the autocratic ruler (Mohammad Ershad). She then served as the PM from 1991 to 1996, and since 2001. Sheikh Hasina, a daughter of Mujib’s, was PM from 1996 to 2001.
Khaleda has tried to focus on improving education, especially for girls, introducing free, mandatory schooling for girls, until the tenth grade. She has also attempted to improve the economy by encouraging investment and the reduction of (non-tariff) trade barriers from its neighbor, India and by encouraging privatization of state-owned enterprises (contributing to a GDP growth of over five percent over the past few years). Recently, agreements on trade, as well as drug trafficking, were signed with India. Khaleda is rated as 29th on Forbes Power Women list.
Though Khaleda has made positive strides to improve Bangladesh’s situation, there are still many issues which need to be resolved before Khaleda can lead the country out of its 50 percent poverty rate. According to the WTO, Bangladesh's main problems include civil unrest, political instability (both internal and external), natural disasters (such as annual flooding), and inadequate infrastructure. Inelasticity of demand for commodities worldwide means that Bangladesh’s terms of trade (in agriculture) decline relatively, as world incomes increase. Other problems include India’s lack of trust of Khaleda’s political alliances (which included parties that support fundamentalist Islam), mismanagement of state-owned enterprises and port facilities, a labor force growth that has outpaced jobs, inefficient use of resources, slow implementation of reforms, and corruption.
Finally, despite widespread poverty and corruption, Bangladesh remains a democracy. That is, elections are free and fair. Although it cannot be considered completely illiberal, it is also not a well-functioning liberal democracy. I wonder what category Zakaria (The Rise of Illiberal Democracy) would place Bangladesh in, as a country with corruption and lawlessness, whose government seems to have liberal goals.
International Leaders: Belgium
Belgium’s king, Albert II has a mainly ceremonial role in the government. His central function in politics is to assign a political leader to form a new cabinet following an election, resignation of a government, or a no confidence vote of the parliament. Thus, Guy Verhofstadt, Belgium’s Prime Minister is considered its leader for the purposes of this review.
Belgium consists of three regions and has two official languages. In Flanders (in the north), the official language is Dutch; in Wallonia (in the south), it is French; and in Brussels (the capital), both languages are used. There is considerable autonomy within each region, which makes governance more difficult. Also, the country is characterized by decentralized governance. For example, the Belgian press is self-regulated (by the Federation of Editors). Further, Belgium has two separate public broadcasting bodies, each with their own practices. Belgium is ranked 9th in Human Development Index rankings (with a HDI of 0.945), above such countries as the US, Japan, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, and the UK.
Guy Verhofstadt began his political career at a very young age; this brought on the nickname, “Baby Thatcher”. At 29 (in 1982), he was chosen as the president of the Flemish liberal party (PVV). At 33, he became Deputy PM and Minister of Budget. In 1991, he changed the PVV into the VLD (Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten), which attracted politicians from other parties. After a failed election, Verhofstadt removed himself from the public eye until 1997 when he returned as the party’s president. In 1999, with the aid of a chance food scandal, his party became the largest and he was elected PM. Verhofstadt also served as President-in-Office of the European Council, where he advocated the “constitutionalisation in the Union”.
Verhofstadt spent his first term as PM trying to increase his popularity by cutting taxes and attempting to boost the economy. This resulted in an unbalanced budget and led to high unemployment and problems in the pension system. Another controversial move was his joining France, Russia, and Germany in opposing the US invasion of Iraq.
Prior to the May 2003 elections, the Socialists and the Liberals renewed their coalition, with Verhofstadt as the PM; the coalition holds about 66 percent of the parliament seats. Interestingly, each main party must represent both the Dutch-speaking Flemish and the French-speaking Walloon communities. As part of his campaigning, Verhofstadt promised to create 200,000 jobs in his second candidacy (that goal will have been missed by about 40 percent). Later, in 2004, Verhofstadt’s candidacy as the next President of the European Commission (the executive branch of the EU) was rejected by British PM Tony Blair and Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi.
During his attempts to improve Belgium’s economy, Verhofstadt has inadvertently worsened the public’s perception of him. For example, in 2005 he planned to increase the Belgian workforce and repair the retiree problem by increasing the minimum retirement age. This move caused a national strike by the country’s three unions and disrupted transportation and postal services.
One of Verhofstadt’s main objectives in the coming months is to improve Belgium’s economy; namely, he seeks to improve the country’s global competitiveness, which has dropped behind faster-growing economies. Thus, Verhofstadt plans to encourage research and development, moderating wage increases, and reducing social insurance taxes; taxes and social security payments comprise 50.2 percent of Belgium's economic output - the fourth-largest share in the EU.
Despite the unpopularity of many of his economic policies, I believe Verhofstadt to be a capable leader. His knowledge of domestic and foreign affairs is comprehensive and he is fairly attentive to the needs of his countrymen. If he can better communicate his plans to the Belgium people and convince them of the need of short-term sacrifices in exchange for long-term benefits, he will have their full support.
Belgium consists of three regions and has two official languages. In Flanders (in the north), the official language is Dutch; in Wallonia (in the south), it is French; and in Brussels (the capital), both languages are used. There is considerable autonomy within each region, which makes governance more difficult. Also, the country is characterized by decentralized governance. For example, the Belgian press is self-regulated (by the Federation of Editors). Further, Belgium has two separate public broadcasting bodies, each with their own practices. Belgium is ranked 9th in Human Development Index rankings (with a HDI of 0.945), above such countries as the US, Japan, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, and the UK.
Guy Verhofstadt began his political career at a very young age; this brought on the nickname, “Baby Thatcher”. At 29 (in 1982), he was chosen as the president of the Flemish liberal party (PVV). At 33, he became Deputy PM and Minister of Budget. In 1991, he changed the PVV into the VLD (Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten), which attracted politicians from other parties. After a failed election, Verhofstadt removed himself from the public eye until 1997 when he returned as the party’s president. In 1999, with the aid of a chance food scandal, his party became the largest and he was elected PM. Verhofstadt also served as President-in-Office of the European Council, where he advocated the “constitutionalisation in the Union”.
Verhofstadt spent his first term as PM trying to increase his popularity by cutting taxes and attempting to boost the economy. This resulted in an unbalanced budget and led to high unemployment and problems in the pension system. Another controversial move was his joining France, Russia, and Germany in opposing the US invasion of Iraq.
Prior to the May 2003 elections, the Socialists and the Liberals renewed their coalition, with Verhofstadt as the PM; the coalition holds about 66 percent of the parliament seats. Interestingly, each main party must represent both the Dutch-speaking Flemish and the French-speaking Walloon communities. As part of his campaigning, Verhofstadt promised to create 200,000 jobs in his second candidacy (that goal will have been missed by about 40 percent). Later, in 2004, Verhofstadt’s candidacy as the next President of the European Commission (the executive branch of the EU) was rejected by British PM Tony Blair and Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi.
During his attempts to improve Belgium’s economy, Verhofstadt has inadvertently worsened the public’s perception of him. For example, in 2005 he planned to increase the Belgian workforce and repair the retiree problem by increasing the minimum retirement age. This move caused a national strike by the country’s three unions and disrupted transportation and postal services.
One of Verhofstadt’s main objectives in the coming months is to improve Belgium’s economy; namely, he seeks to improve the country’s global competitiveness, which has dropped behind faster-growing economies. Thus, Verhofstadt plans to encourage research and development, moderating wage increases, and reducing social insurance taxes; taxes and social security payments comprise 50.2 percent of Belgium's economic output - the fourth-largest share in the EU.
Despite the unpopularity of many of his economic policies, I believe Verhofstadt to be a capable leader. His knowledge of domestic and foreign affairs is comprehensive and he is fairly attentive to the needs of his countrymen. If he can better communicate his plans to the Belgium people and convince them of the need of short-term sacrifices in exchange for long-term benefits, he will have their full support.
International Leaders: Chad
This short discussion is about the coming into power of, and the uniqueness of the president of Chad, Idriss Déby. While there are numerous topics that can be discussed in depth with regards to Déby (such as the Darfur region, rebel fighting, refugees from nearby countries, the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline, Chadian politics and corruption, human rights violation, low human development figures and almost non-existent infrastructure, the reshuffling of government, consolidation of power by Déby, and so forth), this discussion focuses on several interesting distinctions about Déby as a leader.
Idriss Déby is a case of a legitimate leader that has come into power through illegitimate means. That is, he has legitimate power, through his presidency; however, this power was gained through the use of coercive power. During the 1980’s, Déby was a leading general in the former president’s government (Habre). In 1989, as a result of ethnic conflicts within the government, Déby (of the Zaghawa ethnic group) defected to Darfur (in Sudan), where he mustered ethnic support. It is fascinating that ethnic differences still divide nations and regions and bring death to millions in our time, especially in Africa, where the extent of these differences is usually quite superficial (such as the name of a group). In 1990 with Libyan aid and no resistance from French troupes in Chad, Déby seized power (along with his Patriotic Salvation Movement) and became president.
Déby has been reelected twice since, though the election proceedings had “numerous serious irregularities”. Interestingly, it is a former rebel group that is now in power (and referred to as “the government”), while all opposing groups (some of which are based in the CAR and Cameroon) are now referred to as “rebels”. These “rebel” forces have attempted two failed coups, but have since signed shaky peace agreements with Déby. Déby has recently successfully passed a referendum on the two-term limit on the presidency. Thus, later this year, Déby will be able to run for his third consecutive term, not including the five years from his seizure of power (1990) to the first elections (1996).
Déby is quite outspoken, as are many leaders in unstable regions who have seized power through force. Such leaders need to communicate an air of authority, both to inspire internal support (for a leader perceived to be strong) and to frighten potential external opposition. Demanding better terms for the oil deal, led by Exxon, Déby has said, "Chad only gets 12.5 percent of royalties from the oil revenues ... I didn't sign the agreement, it was my predecessor ... it's a fool's agreement."
While Déby has taken some steps to improve the overall situation in Chad, as well as creating a multiparty government, his power is still very much centralized – with the support of the growing military and oil revenues. This is also seen in the judicial system. The constitution guarantees judicial independence, though Déby controls the naming of the entire Supreme Court. The steps described below may be intended to reduce Déby’s risk of losing power.
Another interesting distinction is that, although there is much corruption, many human rights violations, very low access to basic inputs (such as electricity, clean water, roads, healthcare, and telecommunications), there seems to be very little opposition to Déby in his government and the Chadian population. Possibly, Déby has been able to keep his allies “fat”. There is also a possibility that a new, younger leader may be even more radical and power-hungry than Déby.
In his mid-fifties and with failing health (as in Arafat’s case), Déby seems to have realized the benefits and necessity of global participation. This, in turn, requires some diplomacy, as well as many compromises. Hence, Déby has entered into economic reform agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, leading to the construction of the Chad-Cameroon Crude Oil Pipeline (Chad being landlocked). Oil revenues are beginning to be collected, though at a lesser rate than anticipated. Also, Déby has just signed a peace deal with Sudanese president, El-Bashir. This deal aims to end the Darfur conflicts (which have led to 180,000 deaths over the past three years) by having each country cease to refuge each other’s rebel groups. But Déby will have to take many more steps before building his credibility in the eyes of the world.
Idriss Déby is a case of a legitimate leader that has come into power through illegitimate means. That is, he has legitimate power, through his presidency; however, this power was gained through the use of coercive power. During the 1980’s, Déby was a leading general in the former president’s government (Habre). In 1989, as a result of ethnic conflicts within the government, Déby (of the Zaghawa ethnic group) defected to Darfur (in Sudan), where he mustered ethnic support. It is fascinating that ethnic differences still divide nations and regions and bring death to millions in our time, especially in Africa, where the extent of these differences is usually quite superficial (such as the name of a group). In 1990 with Libyan aid and no resistance from French troupes in Chad, Déby seized power (along with his Patriotic Salvation Movement) and became president.
Déby has been reelected twice since, though the election proceedings had “numerous serious irregularities”. Interestingly, it is a former rebel group that is now in power (and referred to as “the government”), while all opposing groups (some of which are based in the CAR and Cameroon) are now referred to as “rebels”. These “rebel” forces have attempted two failed coups, but have since signed shaky peace agreements with Déby. Déby has recently successfully passed a referendum on the two-term limit on the presidency. Thus, later this year, Déby will be able to run for his third consecutive term, not including the five years from his seizure of power (1990) to the first elections (1996).
Déby is quite outspoken, as are many leaders in unstable regions who have seized power through force. Such leaders need to communicate an air of authority, both to inspire internal support (for a leader perceived to be strong) and to frighten potential external opposition. Demanding better terms for the oil deal, led by Exxon, Déby has said, "Chad only gets 12.5 percent of royalties from the oil revenues ... I didn't sign the agreement, it was my predecessor ... it's a fool's agreement."
While Déby has taken some steps to improve the overall situation in Chad, as well as creating a multiparty government, his power is still very much centralized – with the support of the growing military and oil revenues. This is also seen in the judicial system. The constitution guarantees judicial independence, though Déby controls the naming of the entire Supreme Court. The steps described below may be intended to reduce Déby’s risk of losing power.
Another interesting distinction is that, although there is much corruption, many human rights violations, very low access to basic inputs (such as electricity, clean water, roads, healthcare, and telecommunications), there seems to be very little opposition to Déby in his government and the Chadian population. Possibly, Déby has been able to keep his allies “fat”. There is also a possibility that a new, younger leader may be even more radical and power-hungry than Déby.
In his mid-fifties and with failing health (as in Arafat’s case), Déby seems to have realized the benefits and necessity of global participation. This, in turn, requires some diplomacy, as well as many compromises. Hence, Déby has entered into economic reform agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, leading to the construction of the Chad-Cameroon Crude Oil Pipeline (Chad being landlocked). Oil revenues are beginning to be collected, though at a lesser rate than anticipated. Also, Déby has just signed a peace deal with Sudanese president, El-Bashir. This deal aims to end the Darfur conflicts (which have led to 180,000 deaths over the past three years) by having each country cease to refuge each other’s rebel groups. But Déby will have to take many more steps before building his credibility in the eyes of the world.
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