Thursday, January 27, 2011
Saturday, April 11, 2009
International Leaders: Thailand
The following is a discussion of the leadership of Thailand’s Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. It is interesting to note the contrasts and similarities between leaders such as Thaksin and North African leaders. Although basic human indicators are higher and the population has a real choice in who to elect, there is still a tint of kleptocracy present. Here, perhaps, it is better hidden from the least educated, rural majority. Also, with essentially fair elections, there is a need for, and a presence of, populism. Still, while the purpose behind Thaksin’s policies may be to gain influence, as we shall see, they have helped increase many of Thailand’s economic indicators and its global standing.
Thaksin began his career in the Royal Thai Police Department in 1973. Within five years, he had obtained Master’s and Doctoral degrees in Criminal Justice in the Unites States and received a high-ranking post in the police force, which he quit in 1980. An entrepreneur at heart, Thaksin and his wife ventured into several unsuccessful business ventures, before founding Shinawatra Computer and Communications Group and becoming the first to introduce cable TV, paging devices and mobile phones to Thailand. In 2001, after forming the political party, “Thais Love Thais” and rallying against political corruption, Thaksin won a landslide election to become Thailand’s PM.
Thaksin has run Thailand like an efficient business. He has privatized a state-owned oil and gas company and has attempted the same with the state-owned electricity company. The revenues from the IPOs are intended to be used to develop renewable energy sources.
Thaksin’s supporters tend to focus on his policies for reduction of rural poverty (through such policies as extended loans to farmers, subsidized gas prices, universal health care for $0.75 per visit, and so on) and his hand in Thailand’s economic recovery from the 1997 crisis. The name given to Thaksin’s economic policies is Thaksinomics. Since Thaksin has become PM, GDP per capita has risen nearly forty percent, and overall GDP has risen from $122 billion to $177.5 billion. During the first four years of his term, poverty dropped by ten percent, Thailand was able to repay its IMF loan two years early, and its national budget was balanced.
Thaksin also received strong support from the provinces as a cause of his swift actions following the tsunami crisis. While touring the southern regions, Thaksin initiated several processes to deal with the devastation. Interestingly, Thaksin refused foreign aid, claiming that Thailand was sufficiently strong to cope on its own.
Finally, support for Thaksin grew as the result of his heavy-handed anti-drug policies, which have reduced drug use in schools and has increased drug prices 2-3 fold (due to the damage done to the drug supply chain).
Thaksin’s opposition calls him a domineering CEO and bases its claims on his self-interest as a businessman, indeed, perhaps Thailand’s richest. There have been clams that Thaksin has used insider knowledge to promote his business interests and to save his business during the Asian Financial Crisis. However, Thaksin is also considered Thailand’s savior during the crisis. Also, in 2001, Thaksin was almost convicted of concealing business assets. There are also (thus far) unproven allegations that Thaksin bribed judges to acquit him. His opposition also claims that Thaksin’s welfare policies cause government overspending and that these reforms must be paid for by the middle class in the form of income tax.
In March of 2006, there was a mass protest outside of Thailand’s Government House, demanding that Thaksin step down. Interestingly, the protesters were the country’s elite who claim that he helped pass a tax-break which helped his family save $667 million in taxes on the sale of a cell phone company.
Thaksin was also alleged to have restricted freedom of the press in more than one incident. For example, in 2005 he sued a Thai newspaper for publishing a sermon given by a monk, in which Thaksin was claimed to desire the presidency, a non-existent position which would remove the king’s powers. Thaksin did not sue the monk, as monks are considered “above criticism”.
Thaksin Shinawatra certainly has improved Thailand’s economy in several ways, though he has burdened the middle class with these costs. It is hard to make a judgment on Thaksin’s leadership, overall. As westerners, we may be quick to judge him as the “right” leader for Thailand. As Buddhists, however, we might claim that Thaksin has forgotten the principles his country was based on in favor of cut-throat capitalism.
Thaksin began his career in the Royal Thai Police Department in 1973. Within five years, he had obtained Master’s and Doctoral degrees in Criminal Justice in the Unites States and received a high-ranking post in the police force, which he quit in 1980. An entrepreneur at heart, Thaksin and his wife ventured into several unsuccessful business ventures, before founding Shinawatra Computer and Communications Group and becoming the first to introduce cable TV, paging devices and mobile phones to Thailand. In 2001, after forming the political party, “Thais Love Thais” and rallying against political corruption, Thaksin won a landslide election to become Thailand’s PM.
Thaksin has run Thailand like an efficient business. He has privatized a state-owned oil and gas company and has attempted the same with the state-owned electricity company. The revenues from the IPOs are intended to be used to develop renewable energy sources.
Thaksin’s supporters tend to focus on his policies for reduction of rural poverty (through such policies as extended loans to farmers, subsidized gas prices, universal health care for $0.75 per visit, and so on) and his hand in Thailand’s economic recovery from the 1997 crisis. The name given to Thaksin’s economic policies is Thaksinomics. Since Thaksin has become PM, GDP per capita has risen nearly forty percent, and overall GDP has risen from $122 billion to $177.5 billion. During the first four years of his term, poverty dropped by ten percent, Thailand was able to repay its IMF loan two years early, and its national budget was balanced.
Thaksin also received strong support from the provinces as a cause of his swift actions following the tsunami crisis. While touring the southern regions, Thaksin initiated several processes to deal with the devastation. Interestingly, Thaksin refused foreign aid, claiming that Thailand was sufficiently strong to cope on its own.
Finally, support for Thaksin grew as the result of his heavy-handed anti-drug policies, which have reduced drug use in schools and has increased drug prices 2-3 fold (due to the damage done to the drug supply chain).
Thaksin’s opposition calls him a domineering CEO and bases its claims on his self-interest as a businessman, indeed, perhaps Thailand’s richest. There have been clams that Thaksin has used insider knowledge to promote his business interests and to save his business during the Asian Financial Crisis. However, Thaksin is also considered Thailand’s savior during the crisis. Also, in 2001, Thaksin was almost convicted of concealing business assets. There are also (thus far) unproven allegations that Thaksin bribed judges to acquit him. His opposition also claims that Thaksin’s welfare policies cause government overspending and that these reforms must be paid for by the middle class in the form of income tax.
In March of 2006, there was a mass protest outside of Thailand’s Government House, demanding that Thaksin step down. Interestingly, the protesters were the country’s elite who claim that he helped pass a tax-break which helped his family save $667 million in taxes on the sale of a cell phone company.
Thaksin was also alleged to have restricted freedom of the press in more than one incident. For example, in 2005 he sued a Thai newspaper for publishing a sermon given by a monk, in which Thaksin was claimed to desire the presidency, a non-existent position which would remove the king’s powers. Thaksin did not sue the monk, as monks are considered “above criticism”.
Thaksin Shinawatra certainly has improved Thailand’s economy in several ways, though he has burdened the middle class with these costs. It is hard to make a judgment on Thaksin’s leadership, overall. As westerners, we may be quick to judge him as the “right” leader for Thailand. As Buddhists, however, we might claim that Thaksin has forgotten the principles his country was based on in favor of cut-throat capitalism.
International Leaders: Myanmar
The following is a review of the military dictatorship of Burma/ Myanmar’s (herein referred to as Myanmar) Than Shwe since 1992. After his 33-year (1953 – 1986) rise to major-general in the military, Than was appointed (in 1988) as a member of the newly-created State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and became the second in command of the previous ruler, General Saw Maung, who resigned in 1992. Than replaced him as Chairman of the Council, head of state, Secretary of Defense and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Than also took command of the military junta, which has been in place since 1989.
Than was, at first, thought to be more liberal than Saw Maung. He released political prisoners, ended the house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (see below), ordered the writing of a Constitution, opened up somewhat to foreign private trade, supported Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), moved toward ending political corruption, and allowed visits of the Red Cross and Amnesty International.
But Than has actually been consolidating power. He is known to be ruthless in dealing with potential opposition from within the government and army. Anyone believed to be defiant or a potential adversary is swiftly removed. Since Than has taken control and, recently, removed PM chief Gen Khin Nyunt from power, there has been increased uncertainty in the top ranks of the army, such as a strange story of a gun battle between the regime’s top three generals. “There is a tremendous amount of uncertainty. Even high ranking officers are not sure where they stand at the moment— if they are found to be linked to Khin Nyunt, they will be fired and face trial.” Also, when Than reached the mandatory retirement age of sixty, he extended it, implying that he may retain his position for the remainder of his life.
Another example of Than’s consolidation of power and intolerance of opposition is his dealing with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) (formed in 1988) and Nobel Peace Prize recipient. In 1989, the new military regime placed her under house arrest, where she has been (periodically) ever since. In 1990, the NLD won a landslide victory, but the military junta denied the election results.
Under Than, there has also been continued persecution of ethnic minorities, such as the Shan and Muslims. The Shan are spread throughout southern Asia and are considered rebels; they have been engaged in civil warfare with Myanmar for years. The Shan’s two main military forces are the Shan State Army North (SSA-N) and Shan State Army South (SSA-S). Myanmar forces have been known to burn down villages and force Shan to flee into neighboring Thailand. Than has also forced about 250,000 Muslims in the north to flee into Bangladesh.
Than is not considered knowledgeable in foreign affairs, thus, he has kept a neutral foreign policy. He has also kept himself and his people relatively isolated from world affairs (for example, by restricting free press). Still, many consider Myanmar as China’s stooge; China supplies the junta with arms and aid. Than has also secured financial aid from India, as a child does from two conflicted parents.
Interestingly, Than believes heavily in soothsaying. On October 25, 2005 Than made an unannounced visit to India. Note that That is distrustful of foreigners and that he had recently ousted Myanmar’s PM, making international travel a risk. It is claimed that Than’s personal astrologer recommended visiting Buddhist holy places in India, in order to avoid the bad luck associated with the October lunar eclipse.
As mentioned, Myanmar is a member of ASEAN; this ensures its maintaining peaceful relations with neighboring ASEAN members, such as Thailand. There has been increased pressure on Than for political reform, especially since, In 2006, Myanmar was scheduled to take over the chairmanship of ASEAN. However, to the relief of ASEAN, Myanmar has skipped its turn to chair the organization, based on the US complaints about its lack of democratic reform.
Than seems to want to be thought of as the effective king of Myanmar and to rule until his death. He has wisely avoided any direct antagonism toward the US and has minimized its exposure to his many human rights violations (for example, by not conducting a census), though Myanmar is known to be the world’s second largest producer of opium. He has also benefited from poor Indian-Chinese relations, as both would like to influence Myanmar. In short, Than is a devout kleptocrat who, in my opinion, is the product of his environment.
Than was, at first, thought to be more liberal than Saw Maung. He released political prisoners, ended the house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (see below), ordered the writing of a Constitution, opened up somewhat to foreign private trade, supported Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), moved toward ending political corruption, and allowed visits of the Red Cross and Amnesty International.
But Than has actually been consolidating power. He is known to be ruthless in dealing with potential opposition from within the government and army. Anyone believed to be defiant or a potential adversary is swiftly removed. Since Than has taken control and, recently, removed PM chief Gen Khin Nyunt from power, there has been increased uncertainty in the top ranks of the army, such as a strange story of a gun battle between the regime’s top three generals. “There is a tremendous amount of uncertainty. Even high ranking officers are not sure where they stand at the moment— if they are found to be linked to Khin Nyunt, they will be fired and face trial.” Also, when Than reached the mandatory retirement age of sixty, he extended it, implying that he may retain his position for the remainder of his life.
Another example of Than’s consolidation of power and intolerance of opposition is his dealing with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) (formed in 1988) and Nobel Peace Prize recipient. In 1989, the new military regime placed her under house arrest, where she has been (periodically) ever since. In 1990, the NLD won a landslide victory, but the military junta denied the election results.
Under Than, there has also been continued persecution of ethnic minorities, such as the Shan and Muslims. The Shan are spread throughout southern Asia and are considered rebels; they have been engaged in civil warfare with Myanmar for years. The Shan’s two main military forces are the Shan State Army North (SSA-N) and Shan State Army South (SSA-S). Myanmar forces have been known to burn down villages and force Shan to flee into neighboring Thailand. Than has also forced about 250,000 Muslims in the north to flee into Bangladesh.
Than is not considered knowledgeable in foreign affairs, thus, he has kept a neutral foreign policy. He has also kept himself and his people relatively isolated from world affairs (for example, by restricting free press). Still, many consider Myanmar as China’s stooge; China supplies the junta with arms and aid. Than has also secured financial aid from India, as a child does from two conflicted parents.
Interestingly, Than believes heavily in soothsaying. On October 25, 2005 Than made an unannounced visit to India. Note that That is distrustful of foreigners and that he had recently ousted Myanmar’s PM, making international travel a risk. It is claimed that Than’s personal astrologer recommended visiting Buddhist holy places in India, in order to avoid the bad luck associated with the October lunar eclipse.
As mentioned, Myanmar is a member of ASEAN; this ensures its maintaining peaceful relations with neighboring ASEAN members, such as Thailand. There has been increased pressure on Than for political reform, especially since, In 2006, Myanmar was scheduled to take over the chairmanship of ASEAN. However, to the relief of ASEAN, Myanmar has skipped its turn to chair the organization, based on the US complaints about its lack of democratic reform.
Than seems to want to be thought of as the effective king of Myanmar and to rule until his death. He has wisely avoided any direct antagonism toward the US and has minimized its exposure to his many human rights violations (for example, by not conducting a census), though Myanmar is known to be the world’s second largest producer of opium. He has also benefited from poor Indian-Chinese relations, as both would like to influence Myanmar. In short, Than is a devout kleptocrat who, in my opinion, is the product of his environment.
International Leaders: Libya
The following is a discussion of the historical and recent leadership of Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi. Rather than listing a timeline of Qadhafi’s dictatorship over Libya, the paper focuses on several interesting and noteworthy facts about his leadership, such as his lack of official office.
Qadhafi came into power in 1969 in a military coup, overthrowing king Idris. He then removed all American and British military bases, as well as expelling the native Italian and Jewish populations and nationalizing all foreign owned petroleum assets in order to have access to those revenues.
This coming into power is all too common in northern African Muslim states (besides Egypt). Also unsurprising is Qadhafi’s strict Islam principles and his military adventurism, being involved in numerous coup attempts in Egypt and Sudan. Further, his military both intervened in Chad’s civil war (as well as serving as a safe haven for separatist groups) and occupied parts of northern Chad – trying to gain access to minerals and influence in the Chadian government – between 1973 and 1987 before being forced to retreat. Under Qadhafi, Libya has claimed 32,000 square kilometers of southern Algeria and 25,000 of Niger. Qadhafi also sponsored terrorism on a global scale in the 1970’s and 80’s, using Libya’s oil revenues.
More unique is Qadhafi’s lack of official office. A decade after his takeover of the Libyan government Qadhafi resigned from all official posts, but retained his dictatorship. This move may have been intended to remove his international accountability (having no position, bodies such as the EU may not be able to hold him responsible for mistreatment of his people, or to blame the Libyan government for having human rights violators, war criminals, or terrorists in leadership positions) and possibly as a demonstration of his ability to keep power without office. The former was unsuccessful as the EU did place sanctions on Libya as a result of Qadhafi’s lack of cooperation in turning over those responsible for the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 in 1988 (such as the bombing’s orchestrator, Mussa Kussa, currently the head of Libyan External Security Organization).
These sanctions were lifted in September of 2003 after Qadhafi took steps to resolve the Pan-Am case, compensating the victims’ families. Since then it seems Qadhafi, like Chad’s Idriss Déby, has realized the need for cooperation with the western world. Also in 2003, Qadhafi agreed to disclose and end Libya’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. In 2004, Libya paid compensation to the families of victims of the UTA (1989) and La Belle disco (1986) bombings. Qadhafi has since hosted several western leaders, as well as traveling to Europe himself. Interestingly, when hosting Italian’s Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, Qadhafi has been known to subject him to watching documentaries of the Italian atrocities against Libya.
There is controversy about weather Qadhafi actually has the support of the Libyan people or weather he is only supported by the elite; it seems as if the latter is the case. While Libya has among Africa’s highest GDP per capita, there is large income disparity between classes, indicating that little of the oil-driven prosperity finds itself in the hands of the masses. Also, in 1993 there was an attempt at Qadhafi’s life by members of the Libyan army. Further, there have been several protests against Qadhafi. After a 1996 soccer match, a violent riot erupted in protest against Qadhafi. In February of 2006, the government organized a “planned demonstration” in front of the Italian consulate against an Italian minister’s wearing of a shirt with a cartoon depiction of Mohamed. Apparently, the demonstration soon turned into a riot of the lower class against Qadhafi’s regime.
Also interesting is Qadhafi’s introduction of the term “jamahiriyya”. The term means “state of the masses” and is intended to reflect control of the “masses” through a representative congress, labor unions, and other large organizations representing majority interests. This novel concept is clearly not reflected in the reality of Libya, especially considering the malcontent shown by the vast majority of the lower class.
In sum, Qadhafi’s military ambitions and his influence on global terrorism make him a very interesting dictator. It seems that, of late, he has become more moderate (no longer seeking to destroy Western capitalism) and that he has taken several steps to improve his (and, perhaps as a consequence, his people’s) global standing. Qadhafi is an example of a revolutionary dictator turned “soft” by the lure of capitalism (or the fear of the western stick). That is, the recent change in Qadhafi’s external attitude was, in the opinion of most, driven by necessity, not enlightenment.
Qadhafi came into power in 1969 in a military coup, overthrowing king Idris. He then removed all American and British military bases, as well as expelling the native Italian and Jewish populations and nationalizing all foreign owned petroleum assets in order to have access to those revenues.
This coming into power is all too common in northern African Muslim states (besides Egypt). Also unsurprising is Qadhafi’s strict Islam principles and his military adventurism, being involved in numerous coup attempts in Egypt and Sudan. Further, his military both intervened in Chad’s civil war (as well as serving as a safe haven for separatist groups) and occupied parts of northern Chad – trying to gain access to minerals and influence in the Chadian government – between 1973 and 1987 before being forced to retreat. Under Qadhafi, Libya has claimed 32,000 square kilometers of southern Algeria and 25,000 of Niger. Qadhafi also sponsored terrorism on a global scale in the 1970’s and 80’s, using Libya’s oil revenues.
More unique is Qadhafi’s lack of official office. A decade after his takeover of the Libyan government Qadhafi resigned from all official posts, but retained his dictatorship. This move may have been intended to remove his international accountability (having no position, bodies such as the EU may not be able to hold him responsible for mistreatment of his people, or to blame the Libyan government for having human rights violators, war criminals, or terrorists in leadership positions) and possibly as a demonstration of his ability to keep power without office. The former was unsuccessful as the EU did place sanctions on Libya as a result of Qadhafi’s lack of cooperation in turning over those responsible for the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 in 1988 (such as the bombing’s orchestrator, Mussa Kussa, currently the head of Libyan External Security Organization).
These sanctions were lifted in September of 2003 after Qadhafi took steps to resolve the Pan-Am case, compensating the victims’ families. Since then it seems Qadhafi, like Chad’s Idriss Déby, has realized the need for cooperation with the western world. Also in 2003, Qadhafi agreed to disclose and end Libya’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. In 2004, Libya paid compensation to the families of victims of the UTA (1989) and La Belle disco (1986) bombings. Qadhafi has since hosted several western leaders, as well as traveling to Europe himself. Interestingly, when hosting Italian’s Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, Qadhafi has been known to subject him to watching documentaries of the Italian atrocities against Libya.
There is controversy about weather Qadhafi actually has the support of the Libyan people or weather he is only supported by the elite; it seems as if the latter is the case. While Libya has among Africa’s highest GDP per capita, there is large income disparity between classes, indicating that little of the oil-driven prosperity finds itself in the hands of the masses. Also, in 1993 there was an attempt at Qadhafi’s life by members of the Libyan army. Further, there have been several protests against Qadhafi. After a 1996 soccer match, a violent riot erupted in protest against Qadhafi. In February of 2006, the government organized a “planned demonstration” in front of the Italian consulate against an Italian minister’s wearing of a shirt with a cartoon depiction of Mohamed. Apparently, the demonstration soon turned into a riot of the lower class against Qadhafi’s regime.
Also interesting is Qadhafi’s introduction of the term “jamahiriyya”. The term means “state of the masses” and is intended to reflect control of the “masses” through a representative congress, labor unions, and other large organizations representing majority interests. This novel concept is clearly not reflected in the reality of Libya, especially considering the malcontent shown by the vast majority of the lower class.
In sum, Qadhafi’s military ambitions and his influence on global terrorism make him a very interesting dictator. It seems that, of late, he has become more moderate (no longer seeking to destroy Western capitalism) and that he has taken several steps to improve his (and, perhaps as a consequence, his people’s) global standing. Qadhafi is an example of a revolutionary dictator turned “soft” by the lure of capitalism (or the fear of the western stick). That is, the recent change in Qadhafi’s external attitude was, in the opinion of most, driven by necessity, not enlightenment.
International Leaders: Germany
Germany’s Chancellor, Dr. Angela Merkel, has had an interesting political career to date. As a woman, she is part of a minority of female world leaders; as the leader of Germany, Merkel likely has the highest official post of any female leader today. One might argue that being a woman has actually helped her stand out in a male-dominated sphere and rapidly advance her career, which seems to have been characterized by a combination of merit and chance. It was not by chance, however, that Merkel became highly educated in sciences (see the fact sheet) and fluent in Russian and English.
Merkel spent her childhood in the countryside of communist East Germany. After the fall of the Berlin Wall she became involved in the democracy movement and joined a new party, Demokratischer Aufbruch. That year her party merged with the West German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and she became Minister for Women and Youth. Merkel’s began to advance, and she became more noticed, when she was chosen as Minister for the Environment and Reactor safety in 1994. In 1998 she was named Secretary-General of the CDU and in 2000, following a CDU financing scandal, she became the first female chair of the CDU. Being a protestant woman from northern Germany, many were surprised by her being chosen to lead a male-dominated, Catholic conservative party with its support base in western and southern Germany. This may indicate that Merkel was highly popular among her party’s constituents and was able to use non-traditional forms of influence within her party.
Avoiding the scandal and openly criticizing higher-ranking party members who were involved (including her mentor), she was able to build her persona as trustworthy, courageous, and credible. Merkel was considered more popular among the German population than among her own party and its ally, the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), whose leader (Edmund Stoiber) outmaneuvered her to become the party’s challenger for Chancellor in 2002. Stoiber lost a lead in the opinion polls and was not elected Chancellor. This helped Merkel become the leader of the opposition and the next candidate for the position of Germany’s Chancellor.
Merkel’s popularity among Germans increased when she criticized the government for supporting Turkish membership in the EU. She also supports strong ties with the US, as well as American open-market concepts. One of Merkel’s main goals is to improve the stagnant German economy (the third largest in the world, behind the US and China). Some of her tasks include reducing high wages and labor protection laws, increasing the average work-week, raising taxes, and improving the 12 percent unemployment rate. Also, she aims to improve the welfare system, which currently accounts for 48 percent of the entire federal budget.
A wave of renewed optimism about Germany’s economic performance in 2006 has been dubbed, The Merkel Factor. The number of Germans who believe that the government can contribute to an improvement in their lives was four times its level before Merkel was elected (just six months prior), 85 percent of respondents in a 2005 Der Spiegel (Germany’s largest weekly magazine) poll thought that 2006 would be a “good year”, consumer confidence was at its highest level in four years, and businesses were more optimistic about the future than they have been since 1989.
From her short hair to her “dull” clothes, it seems that Merkel is very non-traditional, especially considering her early years. Merkel studied sciences during a time when the field was heavily dominated by men; in fact, she obtained the highest degree in physical chemistry. Also, Merkel, in her second marriage, has never had children; this was likely due to beginning her political career at a young age. Finally, she is said to have become apt at hiding her emotions while spending nearly four decades in a communist society in which State Security Police were informed of every political dissent. Still, many perceive her as Germany’s new motherly figure.
Relative to many other world leaders, Merkel does not have “serious” problems; her country is not at war and its people are not dying of famine. Further, Germany’s strict code law system makes corruption less of a problem (though it does not eliminate it). Merkel’s problem in the near future will be maintaining her popularity among the German people while implementing plans to reform an outdated system of taxation, labor laws, welfare, and so on. Merkel must face a tradeoff: on one hand, labor unions have gone on warning strikes and workers seek higher wages; on the other hand, employers are not profitable with the currently high cost of labor and restrictions on firing people. How her Chancellorship unfolds and where she stands among her people will depend on her choices.
Merkel spent her childhood in the countryside of communist East Germany. After the fall of the Berlin Wall she became involved in the democracy movement and joined a new party, Demokratischer Aufbruch. That year her party merged with the West German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and she became Minister for Women and Youth. Merkel’s began to advance, and she became more noticed, when she was chosen as Minister for the Environment and Reactor safety in 1994. In 1998 she was named Secretary-General of the CDU and in 2000, following a CDU financing scandal, she became the first female chair of the CDU. Being a protestant woman from northern Germany, many were surprised by her being chosen to lead a male-dominated, Catholic conservative party with its support base in western and southern Germany. This may indicate that Merkel was highly popular among her party’s constituents and was able to use non-traditional forms of influence within her party.
Avoiding the scandal and openly criticizing higher-ranking party members who were involved (including her mentor), she was able to build her persona as trustworthy, courageous, and credible. Merkel was considered more popular among the German population than among her own party and its ally, the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), whose leader (Edmund Stoiber) outmaneuvered her to become the party’s challenger for Chancellor in 2002. Stoiber lost a lead in the opinion polls and was not elected Chancellor. This helped Merkel become the leader of the opposition and the next candidate for the position of Germany’s Chancellor.
Merkel’s popularity among Germans increased when she criticized the government for supporting Turkish membership in the EU. She also supports strong ties with the US, as well as American open-market concepts. One of Merkel’s main goals is to improve the stagnant German economy (the third largest in the world, behind the US and China). Some of her tasks include reducing high wages and labor protection laws, increasing the average work-week, raising taxes, and improving the 12 percent unemployment rate. Also, she aims to improve the welfare system, which currently accounts for 48 percent of the entire federal budget.
A wave of renewed optimism about Germany’s economic performance in 2006 has been dubbed, The Merkel Factor. The number of Germans who believe that the government can contribute to an improvement in their lives was four times its level before Merkel was elected (just six months prior), 85 percent of respondents in a 2005 Der Spiegel (Germany’s largest weekly magazine) poll thought that 2006 would be a “good year”, consumer confidence was at its highest level in four years, and businesses were more optimistic about the future than they have been since 1989.
From her short hair to her “dull” clothes, it seems that Merkel is very non-traditional, especially considering her early years. Merkel studied sciences during a time when the field was heavily dominated by men; in fact, she obtained the highest degree in physical chemistry. Also, Merkel, in her second marriage, has never had children; this was likely due to beginning her political career at a young age. Finally, she is said to have become apt at hiding her emotions while spending nearly four decades in a communist society in which State Security Police were informed of every political dissent. Still, many perceive her as Germany’s new motherly figure.
Relative to many other world leaders, Merkel does not have “serious” problems; her country is not at war and its people are not dying of famine. Further, Germany’s strict code law system makes corruption less of a problem (though it does not eliminate it). Merkel’s problem in the near future will be maintaining her popularity among the German people while implementing plans to reform an outdated system of taxation, labor laws, welfare, and so on. Merkel must face a tradeoff: on one hand, labor unions have gone on warning strikes and workers seek higher wages; on the other hand, employers are not profitable with the currently high cost of labor and restrictions on firing people. How her Chancellorship unfolds and where she stands among her people will depend on her choices.
International Leaders: French Guiana
French Guiana (FG) is a difficult case, in that it is not an independent country, but an overseas department (DOM) of France. Until 1951, FG was similar to early Australia, serving mainly as a penal settlement. Currently, the French president appoints a representative (or Préfet) and FG is considered a part of the European Union (Using the Euro and the French legal system, constitution, Armed Forces, and flag). With its dependency on France, one would not naturally consider France’s Préfet to FG as a world leader. Still, as Jacques Chirac has already been discussed, this review focuses on Ange Mancini, the Prefect of French Guiana. It is worth noting that only about five percent of FG’s 200,000 nationals want independence from France.
FG’s status precludes it from being listed on such websites as the World Bank and the US State Department and online news searches for its prefect return no matches. Indeed, after considerable time researching, the only information available seemed to be Mancini’s year of birth (1944). Exploring the EU’s Europa website, a FG developmental report revealed a website for the “Préfecture de la Région Guyane”, which does have some information on Mancini; however, it is in French. So, the information about Mancini (below) has been crudely interpreted.
A map of FG reveals that over 90 percent of its communes are concentrated along the coast in the north. The rest are along its borders and Säul (with a population of under 200) is the only “main” commune in the middle of the country. Cayenne, the capital, is the home of almost a third of the country’s population, 90 percent of which lives on the coast.
Prefect Ange Mancini was born in the French Alps. After completing his undergraduate education in the late 1960’s, he began a long and lucrative career in the French police forces. After becoming a police chief in 1973, he moved into the Criminal Investigation Department of Paris. Throughout his career, there has been a focus on anti-terrorism and anti-crime work. By the early 1990’s he had led and created several units with the aim of confronting urban organized and non-organized crime, before becoming the Associated Central Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (1995) and the General Manager of the National Police Force.
During his annual governmental addresses (between 2003 and 2006), Mancini’s intentions as a leader were revealed through his focus. Also, it is evident that, while he prefers to discus achievements, he also addresses the obstacles he faces. Mancini is concentrating his efforts on improving the population’s basic needs, while also trying to spur FG’s economy (FG’s unemployment percentage is in the twenties). Improving the transportation infrastructure has been his main goal (and, as he calls it, his department’s plague or black spot). Though he has managed to open a new bridge, connecting by road two communes, there is still a high level of roadway death caused by poor conditions. He has been trying to encourage “entrepreneurial dynamism” and foreign capital, in addition to the French and European aid. It is worth noting that the European Space Center in FG has brought with it several developments, but its skill requirements make it a mismatch for the human capital currently available in FG.
With his background in crime fighting, Mancini has done much to stop “clandestine gold washing”, “resource plundering”, and “illegal fishing”. He takes pride in having “more than 100 ‘Anaconda’ operations and nearly two tons… of seized or destroyed goods” (a rough translation). In 2005, Mancini took pride in the catching of 344 illegal fishermen (fishing accounting for about 75 percent of exports). There is no mention whether these fishermen were FG citizens.
It is interesting that Mancini would choose to focus resources to combat black market fishing at a time when his main goal is to provide basic needs for the people of FG. Black market fishing seems far less severe than illegal arms of drug trade and, although unregulated, contributed to FG’s GDP. One would assume that these resources could be used more efficiently.
Despite his preoccupation with crime prevention, Mancini’s focus on the future seems to make him an appropriate representative to this developing area.
FG’s status precludes it from being listed on such websites as the World Bank and the US State Department and online news searches for its prefect return no matches. Indeed, after considerable time researching, the only information available seemed to be Mancini’s year of birth (1944). Exploring the EU’s Europa website, a FG developmental report revealed a website for the “Préfecture de la Région Guyane”, which does have some information on Mancini; however, it is in French. So, the information about Mancini (below) has been crudely interpreted.
A map of FG reveals that over 90 percent of its communes are concentrated along the coast in the north. The rest are along its borders and Säul (with a population of under 200) is the only “main” commune in the middle of the country. Cayenne, the capital, is the home of almost a third of the country’s population, 90 percent of which lives on the coast.
Prefect Ange Mancini was born in the French Alps. After completing his undergraduate education in the late 1960’s, he began a long and lucrative career in the French police forces. After becoming a police chief in 1973, he moved into the Criminal Investigation Department of Paris. Throughout his career, there has been a focus on anti-terrorism and anti-crime work. By the early 1990’s he had led and created several units with the aim of confronting urban organized and non-organized crime, before becoming the Associated Central Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (1995) and the General Manager of the National Police Force.
During his annual governmental addresses (between 2003 and 2006), Mancini’s intentions as a leader were revealed through his focus. Also, it is evident that, while he prefers to discus achievements, he also addresses the obstacles he faces. Mancini is concentrating his efforts on improving the population’s basic needs, while also trying to spur FG’s economy (FG’s unemployment percentage is in the twenties). Improving the transportation infrastructure has been his main goal (and, as he calls it, his department’s plague or black spot). Though he has managed to open a new bridge, connecting by road two communes, there is still a high level of roadway death caused by poor conditions. He has been trying to encourage “entrepreneurial dynamism” and foreign capital, in addition to the French and European aid. It is worth noting that the European Space Center in FG has brought with it several developments, but its skill requirements make it a mismatch for the human capital currently available in FG.
With his background in crime fighting, Mancini has done much to stop “clandestine gold washing”, “resource plundering”, and “illegal fishing”. He takes pride in having “more than 100 ‘Anaconda’ operations and nearly two tons… of seized or destroyed goods” (a rough translation). In 2005, Mancini took pride in the catching of 344 illegal fishermen (fishing accounting for about 75 percent of exports). There is no mention whether these fishermen were FG citizens.
It is interesting that Mancini would choose to focus resources to combat black market fishing at a time when his main goal is to provide basic needs for the people of FG. Black market fishing seems far less severe than illegal arms of drug trade and, although unregulated, contributed to FG’s GDP. One would assume that these resources could be used more efficiently.
Despite his preoccupation with crime prevention, Mancini’s focus on the future seems to make him an appropriate representative to this developing area.
International Leaders: Egypt
The following is a discussion of the leadership of Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt. This discussion does not attempt to delineate the military history of Mubarak, nor does it focus on the timeline of his presidency. Instead, we discuss several interesting facts about Mubarak as a nation leader. Suffice it to say that Mubarak was born into an upper-middle class family and received his military education in Egypt and the Soviet Union, moving up the ranks of the Egyptian military before going into politics in the mid 1970’s and becoming President in 1981.
Mubarak’s leadership has been quite interesting. Although he was elected in 1981, he has also been reelected four times since. As was the case in Iraq with Hussein, until 2005, no one ran against Mubarak, due to the constitution which gives the People’s Assembly the main role in electing the President. This was the case until 2006, when Mubarak, under international pressure, passed an amendment allowing parties to run against the President; still, strict criteria must be met and there may be no religion-based political parties. The 2005 elections caused rioting against the rigging of votes by Mubarak’s party. As a result, the Egyptian police killed at least eight people on December 7th outside a polling station.
After getting Egypt readmitted to the Arab League in 1989, Mubarak began to lose support after unsuccessfully utilizing Egypt’s economic growth to meet people’s basic needs. Egypt’s ranking on the List of countries by Human Development Index (119) places it well below countries such as Mongolia, Nicaragua, and even the Palestinian Territories. Egypt also ranks 70th of 159 on the Corruption Perceptions Index under such countries as Mexico, Ghana, and Cuba. Freedom of expression has also been an issue increasing opposition against Mubarak. In March 2006, a female journalist was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for claiming that an Egyptian judge took bribes. This was the second such sentence imposed in two weeks.
Although Mubarak was popular among the people of Egypt before his presidency and through the early part of it, it seems as if he has lost much of his support. Egyptian and international entities alike are claiming that it is time for new leadership in Egypt. Egyptians, it seems, want to move toward liberalism. Mubarak, no matter how much he claims it, is not taking the necessary steps to meet his nation’s aspirations.
Mubarak’s leadership has been quite interesting. Although he was elected in 1981, he has also been reelected four times since. As was the case in Iraq with Hussein, until 2005, no one ran against Mubarak, due to the constitution which gives the People’s Assembly the main role in electing the President. This was the case until 2006, when Mubarak, under international pressure, passed an amendment allowing parties to run against the President; still, strict criteria must be met and there may be no religion-based political parties. The 2005 elections caused rioting against the rigging of votes by Mubarak’s party. As a result, the Egyptian police killed at least eight people on December 7th outside a polling station.
After getting Egypt readmitted to the Arab League in 1989, Mubarak began to lose support after unsuccessfully utilizing Egypt’s economic growth to meet people’s basic needs. Egypt’s ranking on the List of countries by Human Development Index (119) places it well below countries such as Mongolia, Nicaragua, and even the Palestinian Territories. Egypt also ranks 70th of 159 on the Corruption Perceptions Index under such countries as Mexico, Ghana, and Cuba. Freedom of expression has also been an issue increasing opposition against Mubarak. In March 2006, a female journalist was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for claiming that an Egyptian judge took bribes. This was the second such sentence imposed in two weeks.
Although Mubarak was popular among the people of Egypt before his presidency and through the early part of it, it seems as if he has lost much of his support. Egyptian and international entities alike are claiming that it is time for new leadership in Egypt. Egyptians, it seems, want to move toward liberalism. Mubarak, no matter how much he claims it, is not taking the necessary steps to meet his nation’s aspirations.
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